SUSTAINABILITY OBLIGATIONS ON HOLD: “STOP THE CLOCK” DIRECTIVE (2025/794/EU) PUBLISHED

On 16 April 2025, Directive (EU) 2025/794 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The text represents the first revision procedure introduced under the Omnibus I Package.

The directive, which will enter into force the day after its publication in the Official Journal, had been adopted without amendments on 14 April by both the European Parliament (under the urgent procedure) and the Council of the EU—reflecting a shared political will to provide greater legal certainty for businesses regarding sustainability reporting and due diligence obligations.

Commonly referred to as the “Stop the Clock” Directive, the measure postpones the deadlines for transposing and applying certain obligations set out under two key pieces of EU legislation:

Directive (EU) 2022/2464 (Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive – CSRD); and Directive (EU) 2024/1760 (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – CSDDD),

which together form the legislative framework addressing sustainability, non-financial reporting obligations, and the duty of due diligence for companies operating within the EU.

Specifically, the Parliament and Council endorsed the Commission’s proposal to defer the following:

two years, the application of CSRD reporting requirements for large companies which have not yet begun reporting, and for listed SMEs.

As a result, large companies with more than 250 employees will now be required to report for the first time on their environmental and social measures in 2028 (instead of 2026), referring to the previous financial year. Listed small and medium-sized enterprises will be required to report a year later.

one year, the transposition deadline and the first phase of CSDDD application for large companies.

EU Member States will now have until 26 July 2027 to transpose the directive into national law. The one-year deferral will also apply to: EU-based companies with over 5,000 employees and a net worldwide turnover exceeding €1.5 billion, and to non-EU companies with turnover generated within the EU above the same threshold, which will now be required to comply with the rules from 2028, instead of 2027. The same timeline applies to EU companies with more than 3,000 employees and a net turnover above €900 million, and non-EU companies exceeding that threshold in turnover generated within the EU.

The directive also specifies that Member States are required to comply with its provisions by 31 December 2025, and to promptly inform the European Commission thereof.

It is worth noting that only the deadlines have been changed while the substance of the CSRD and CSDDD remains unchanged.

Background

In October 2024, the European Council called on all institutions to advance work in response to the challenges identified in the reports by Enrico Letta ("Much more than a market") and Mario Draghi ("The future of European competitiveness"). In the Budapest Declaration of 8 November 2024, it was specifically requested to launch a simplification revolution in order to ensure a clear, simple and smart regulatory framework for businesses and to drastically reduce administrative, regulatory and reporting burdens, particularly for SMEs.

On 26 February 2025, following the call from EU leaders, the Commission presented two packages: Omnibus I and Omnibus II, aimed at simplifying existing legislation in the areas of sustainability and investment, respectively.

The Commission proposed these omnibus packages to ease sustainability-related rules and promote the competitiveness of European businesses. The goal is to create a more favourable environment for investment, growth and the creation of quality jobs, without compromising the objectives of the Green Deal.

Specifically, the aim is to reduce administrative burdens by 25% (and by 35% for SMEs), by reviewing rules considered excessive, overlapping or disproportionate. The proposed changes concern key directives such as the CSRD, the CSDDD, the CBAM, and the InvestEU regulation. All of this is in line with the recommendations of the aforementioned reports and the European Competitiveness Compass.

Useful links for further information

Council of the EU press release on 14/04/2025: link European Parliament press release on 03/04/2025: link Q&As on the Omnibus I and II Simplification Packages: link

US TAX FORMS: WHICH ONES DOES YOUR COMPANY NEED TO SUBMIT?

Understanding and complying with tax obligations in the United States is fundamental to any company’s success and legal compliance. Below, we detail the main tax forms your company may need to submit, including descriptions, who must file and important dates.

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CHECK IF YOUR COMPANY IS OBLIGED TO PRESENT THE ANNUAL REPORT

Property taxes in the US are one of the main sources of revenue for local governments in the United States, and are essential for funding public services such as education, infrastructure, security and health. In 2022, these taxes represented approximately 27.4% of total state and local tax collections, surpassing other sources of tax revenue.

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NR-01: MENTAL HEALTH IN COMPANIES AND THE DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE

The recent update of Regulatory Standard No. 01 (NR-01), through MTE Ordinance No. 1,419 of August 28, 2024, brought important changes that directly impact companies in terms of Occupational Risk Management (ORM). One of the main changes is the obligation to include the management of psychosocial risks in the workplace, in the preparation and implementation of the Risk Management Program (PGR).

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BRAZIL GROWS FOR THE 4TH CONSECUTIVE YEAR; GROWTH IN 2024 EXCEEDS FORECAST, HIGHLIGHTS PLANNING

Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 0.2% in the fourth quarter of this year compared to the third and 3.4% in all of 2024 compared to 2023, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) reported this Friday (7/3). The Ministry of Planning and Budget assesses that the result was positive, “the fourth year of consecutive growth after the peak of the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Brazilian economy and above market expectations at the beginning of 2024”, according to a note published by the Executive Secretariat.

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BRAZIL CLOSES DEAL WITH VIETNAM AND OPENS MARKET FOR BEEF

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced the opening of the Vietnamese market for Brazilian beef. The agreement was signed during a state visit to Hanoi and is part of the 2025-2030 Action Plan of the Brazil-Vietnam Strategic Partnership, and is considered an important step forward to boost exports and attract investment to the agro-industrial sector.

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BRAZIL WILL HAVE TWO MORE AIRLINES OPERATING IN 2025

Brazil will have two new airlines in operation this year: Avion Express and Total Linhas Aéreas. Both have obtained the Air Operator Certificate (COA) from the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC). The information was published by the IG portal.

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STRIKE RAISES R$77 MILLION AND ARRIVES IN BRAZIL; SUSTINERI PISCIS RAISES R$9.39 MILLION: THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEK IN THE ECOSYSTEM

This week, we talked about the arrival in Brazil of Strike , a Uruguayan startup founded by "good hacker" Santiago Rosenblatt, which raised R$77 million in a Series A round and will use part of the capital to start operations here.

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BRAZIL STANDS OUT IN THE GROWING GOVTECH MARKET

In terms of technological advances applied to the public sector, Brazil stands out as a protagonist in the GovTech ecosystem . Just like a gear that adjusts and evolves in response to the need for movement, the Brazilian market for technological solutions for governments has demonstrated accelerated and consistent growth, driven by a combination of internal and external factors.

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Regulatory landscape and legal basis

On April 2, 2025, the Presidential Executive Order “Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits” (“EO”) introduced a new 10% ad valorem tariff across the board (applicable to all goods with a few exceptions) originating from almost all countries of the world and effective April 5, 2025. The same EO added a reciprocal tariff of an additional 10% ad valorem tariff for goods imported in the US and originating from the European Union, effective April 9, 2025. The EO grounded such new tariffs on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2483), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the U.S.C. From a legal perspective, an EO is not a federal statute but a directive (pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution) that manages operations of the federal government and directs the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Even if the EO has the force of law similar to regulations issued by federal agencies, it cannot contradict existing federal statutes, it is subject to judicial review if unconstitutional (e.g., overturned by the U.S. Court of International Trade and/or by any U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), and it cannot provide federal funding. An EO can be revoked at any moment by another EO and overturned by Congress.

Which branch of the U.S. Government can regulate tariffs? 

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises” and “to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” Only Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate tariffs, unless delegated to the Executive. In the last 50 years or so, Congress has delegated some of this constitutional authority to the U.S. President in case of emergencies. It did so with: (a) The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) to adjust imports if they threaten national security; (b) The Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301) to take action against unfair trade practices; and (c) The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), to regulate commerce during national emergencies.

Procedure to declare a U.S. national emergency

Each of the federal statutes mentioned above has a procedure that can result in a declaration of national emergency. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) established an emergency procedure initiated by the Secretary of Commerce, by another agency, by industry stakeholders, or by Congress. Such investigations to determine if imports threaten national security can last up to 270 days. If there is a threat, a report is sent to the President with recommendations, and the President has 90 days to decide whether to adjust imports through tariffs or quotas; negotiate agreements with other countries; take other actions deemed necessary; or take no action. Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301), the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) can initiate an investigation sua sponte or based on a petition from an industry or from the President. The USTR has 12/18 months to determine if a foreign country's practices are violating trade agreements or if they are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory. If a practice is found unfair, the USTR must determine appropriate action within 30 days, including suspending trade concessions, imposing tariffs or other import restrictions, or entering into binding agreements to eliminate the unfair practice. The IEEPA gives the U.S. President the power to declare a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act but must specify the unusual and extraordinary threat. It must declare that the threat originates wholly or substantially outside the U.S. In that case, the President must immediately transmit the declaration to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register. The President can then investigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange transactions; block transfers or transactions involving property of foreign countries/nationals; freeze assets; and/or prohibit imports or exports. The President must consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before exercising such powers. As of today, we have little to no evidence that the U.S. Presidency set in motion the statutory procedures to declare a national economic emergency.

Was the U.S. economy economically and unusually threatened? 

Examples of unusual and extraordinary threats that originate wholly or substantially outside the U.S. (under the IEEPA) are (a) foreign terrorism activities; (b) state-sponsored threats; (c) transnational criminal organizations; (d) cyber threats; (e) weapons proliferation; (f) regional destabilization; (g) global health emergencies; and (h) economic threats (e.g., manipulation of critical resources by foreign governments or foreign government policies that undermine international financial stability). As of today, experts agree that current international economic challenges do not appear to be “unusually and exceptionally” threatening the U.S. economy especially if compared by historical standards (e.g., with reference to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo; the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis; and the 2008 global financial crisis).

Political landscape: What are the goals behind the April 2, 205 EO? 

The EO grounded the new tariffs on the intent to strengthen U.S. national sovereignty because allegedly the U.S. trade deficit is a threat to U.S. sovereignty, justifying the declaration of a “national emergency” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The new tariffs reflect an intent to redefine global trade rules in favor of U.S. interests, challenging the free trade agreements and alliances, and suspending contributions to international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Practically, the EO is a symbolic assertion of strength against foreign nations and a negotiation tool to force foreign nations to accept harsher conditions.

Is the U.S. trade deficit an economic issue for the U.S. economy? 

Before 2025, the U.S. showed clear signs of strength with steady GDP growth and moderate unemployment. The U.S. economy grew by 2.8% in 2024, a slight decrease from the 2.9% growth in 2023. The majority of economists agree that a trade deficit can coexist with a strong economy. The U.S. has maintained trade deficits for decades while experiencing significant economic growth, low unemployment, and technological leadership. The U.S. economy is consumption-driven (roughly 70% of GDP), with Americans having strong purchasing power for global goods.

How to reduce the U.S. trade deficit? 

The majority of the economists agree that to reduce a trade deficit, a multi-pronged and long-term approach is needed, among which are increasing export competitiveness (to improve productivity while providing export assistance and supporting research and development and devaluing currency), improving trade policy, developing import substitutes, and adjusting macroeconomic policies (reducing borrowing from overseas). Policies that could trigger retaliatory measures or disrupt global supply chains should be avoided.

Are new tariffs alone a tool to reduce the U.S. trade deficit? 

Economists agree that a hike in tariffs alone is generally not considered the most effective or appropriate tool for reducing the U.S. trade deficit. While reducing specific imports in the short term, tariffs cause retaliatory measures from trading partners (potentially reducing U.S. exports and nullifying deficit reduction). Tariffs act as a tax on U.S. consumers and businesses (slowing economic growth) and don't address the fundamental macroeconomic factors driving the trade deficit.

What is the next move for the EU? 

While the U.S. economy felt the impact caused by the new EO internally, showing signs of deceleration and inflation (Wall Street lost $6.5 trillion between April 5 and 6, 2025), such an initiative triggered a risk of a global trade war. The EU is planning to reinstate the Suspended Duties policy (effective April 1, 2025) on U.S. goods and plans new tariffs on additional U.S. goods, among which are agricultural (meat, grains), consumer items (dental floss, toilet paper), and luxury products (diamonds).

What is the outcome of a trade war in a 6-month period? 

Based on the current data, in the short term the EU may suffer the impact of such a trade war. However, according to the experts, in the long run, the U.S. may suffer the most from isolation, disruption of the global supply chain, and inflation.

6-month projections losses

Economy: GDP Impact EU: -0.8% U.S.: -0.5% Inflation Spike EU: +1.5% U.S.: +2.0% Job Losses EU: 500K U.S.: 300K

What is the next move for U.S. and EU businesses? In order to weather this new uncertain economic time and risk of a trade war, U.S. and EU companies may adopt a number of measures, among which

(a) restructuring the supply chain, e.g., nearshoring/reshoring to tariff-exempt countries;

(b) not relying on China;

(c) introducing customs tactics (e.g., first-sale; HTS reclassification);

(d) anti-coercion measures;

(e) cost-sharing;

(f) commencing litigation before a federal court; and

(g) commencing a serious business plan and implementing a serious acquisition strategy in the U.S.

This newsletter provides a selection of regulatory news and comments from our SPANISH legal experts on interesting policy developments, recent case law, and new regulatory directions of major industry practices. The aim is to provide an up-to-date tool for quick and easy consultation on the most current and important topics at a SPANISH level.

Tariffs on European wine imports in the U.S. market were set to rise by up to 200%, according to announcements from the White House. Some local farmers welcomed the news, believing it would boost demand for American products, while others opposed possible policies due to poor harvests caused by wildfires, droughts, and other crop damage.[1]

To put things in perspective, the 2025 OIVE Economic Report shows that the U.S. increased its wine imports to 1.226 billion liters, valued at $6.789 billion. Nearly 5.5% of U.S. imports (67.3 million liters) come from Spain. Notably, December 2024 saw the sharpest surge in imports due to uncertainty over potential tariffs.[2]

Major wine exporters like Spain, France, and Italy have pressured Brussels to prevent the U.S. from imposing these tariffs at all costs. Ultimately, the European Commission excluded bourbon from its list of products facing a 25% tariff, averting the 200% increase on the other side of the Atlantic.[3] The historic alliance is now forced to negotiate and ease tensions fueled by threats from one side and retaliatory measures from the other. However, on the global stage, the EU –and Spain in particular– has begun moving closer to the U.S.’s current rival, China, to diversify export partnerships and bypass U.S. tariffs.[4] As the European Commission's vicepresident Kaja Kallas warned: "Only China will benefit from a transatlantic trade war".

[1]      CNN Business, article by Samantha Delouya https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/22/economy/tariff-eu-trade-war-california-wine/index.html

[2]      Interprofesional del Vino https://interprofesionaldelvino.es/informe-de-importaciones-de-vino-en-eeuu/

[3]      El Economista, article by Lidia Montes https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/13308014/04/25/bruselas-apunta-al-maiz-el-calzado-y-los-muebles-en-su-respuesta-arancelaria-a-trump.html

[4]      El Economista https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/13307985/04/25/se-afianza-la-relacion-entre-xi-jinping-y-sanchez-en-plena-guerra-arancelaria-china-pone-a-espana-a-la-vanguardia-de-sus-vinculos-europeos.html

We are pleased to participate in Legal Recruiting Day 4.0, an event organized by ELSA Bologna, scheduled for April 1, 2025, from 2:00 PM to 6:30 PM, at Sala Feste, Palazzo Malvezzi, Via Zamboni 22, Bologna.

This event represents a valuable opportunity for law students and recent graduates to connect with leading law firms and gain deeper insights into career development in the legal field.

An event dedicated to the future of the legal profession

The day will open with institutional greetings from Dr. Elena Nasi, President of ELSA Bologna, and Dr. Sofia Pagnanucci, Vice President for Professional Development at ELSA Bologna.

Program

14:00 - 14:45 | Opening speech by Professor Tassani, who will share his experience as a supervisor of internships, early legal practice, and postgraduate career guidance. 14:45 - 15:15 | Presentation of the participating law firms, focusing on their respective practice areas and career opportunities. 15:15 - 18:00 | One-on-one meetings: students will have the chance to personally interact with professionals at the information desks. 18:00 - 18:30 | Networking cocktail: the event will conclude with an informal networking session between students and legal professionals.

Our commitment to fostering young legal professionals

We firmly believe that talent and education are the foundation of a successful legal career. That’s why, during the event, we will be available to present our career opportunities, including:

Curricular and extracurricular internships Training programs in various legal fields Structured legal traineeships

Legal Recruiting Day 4.0 will be a unique opportunity to get to know our law firm, our approach to the profession, and the career paths available for future legal professionals.

We look forward to meeting you on April 1 in Bologna!

In the Official Gazette No. 6,890 Extraordinary, dated March 6, 2025, Decree No. 5,104 of the same date (Customs Exemptions Decree - the “Decree”) was published, issued by the Presidency of the Republic. This Decree establishes import tax and value-added tax exemptions for the goods and sectors specified therein.

The exemptions established by the Decree are as follows:

A 90% exemption from Import Tax and a 90% exemption from Value-Added Tax is granted for the definitive importation of new or used tangible personal property classified under the tariff codes listed in Appendix I of the Decree. These imports must be carried out by agencies and entities of the National Public Administration or by natural or legal persons using their own resources. (Art. 3). This tax benefit applies automatically. Import Tax and Value-Added Tax are exempted for the definitive importation of tangible personal property classified under the tariff codes listed in Appendix II of the Decree, provided that the imports are carried out exclusively by the Ministry of Popular Power for Electric Energy or its affiliated agencies and entities. (Art. 4) Import Tax and Value-Added Tax are exempted for the definitive importation of tangible personal property classified under the tariff codes listed in Appendix III of the Decree, provided that the imports are carried out exclusively by the Ministry of Popular Power for Water Services or its affiliated agencies and entities. (Art. 5) Import Tax and Value-Added Tax are exempted for the definitive importation of tangible personal property classified under the tariff codes listed in Appendix IV of the Decree, provided that the imports are carried out exclusively by the Ministry of Popular Power for Ecological Mining Development or its affiliated agencies and entities, as well as those carried out exclusively by the Venezuelan Corporation of Guayana (CVG) or its affiliated companies. (Art. 6)

The Decree states that, in order to benefit from the exemptions established in Chapter II (On Exemptions), beneficiaries must comply with the common requirements specified in Chapter III when registering their declaration. (Art. 7)

The exemption benefit provided in the Decree will apply as of the date of registration of the respective Customs Declaration for importation. (Art. 15)

Failure to comply with any of the conditions by the beneficiaries will result in the loss of the exemption benefit established in the Decree. In such cases, the imported goods subject to the benefit will be considered taxable, without prejudice to any applicable penalties. (Art. 16)

Likewise, the exemption benefit will be revoked for those who: (i) fail to comply with the periodic evaluation requirements established in Articles 13 and 14 of the Decree and the parameters set by SENIAT; (ii) fail to comply with the obligations established in the Constituent Decree enacting the Organic Tax Code and other tax regulations, as well as in the Organic Customs Law; (iii) fall under any of the cases specified in Article 177 of the Organic Customs Law. (Art. 17)

Without prejudice to the provisions of the Decree, the National Executive may issue the Certificate of No National Production (CNP) or the Certificate of Insufficient National Production (CPNI) in accordance with the Law on Value-Added Tax, even if the goods for which the certificate is issued are classified under one of the tariff codes contained in Appendix I of the Decree. (Art. 18)

The Minister responsible for economy, finance, and foreign trade may, by resolution, add or remove tariff codes from the Appendices of the Decree, as well as create or eliminate Appendices. (Art. 19)

The exemption benefits established in the Decree will apply from its effective date until June 30, 2025. (Art. 22)

Decree No. 5,071 of December 27, 2024, published in Official Gazette No. 6,869 Extraordinary of the same date, is repealed. (Art. 23)

The Decree came into effect five (5) business days after its publication in the Official Gazette.

If you have any questions or comments regarding this matter or require further information, please contact the partner in charge of your account via email.

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L'UE IMPONE DAZI ANTI-DUMPING SUI FILATI IN FIBRA DI VETRO CINESI

La Commissione Europea ha introdotto dazi anti-dumping definitivi sulle importazioni di filati in fibra di vetro (GFY) dalla Cina, rafforzando il proprio impegno per un commercio equo e regolamentato.

Questa decisione segue un’indagine avviata il 16 febbraio 2024 ai sensi dell'Articolo 5 del Regolamento (UE) 2016/1036, in risposta a un reclamo presentato il 3 gennaio 2024 da Glass Fibre Europe, l’associazione che rappresenta l’industria europea del settore. Il reclamo evidenziava pratiche di dumping e danni economici significativi per i produttori UE, spingendo la Commissione ad intervenire.

Il 15 ottobre 2024, l'UE aveva già imposto dazi provvisori tramite il Regolamento di esecuzione (UE) 2024/2673. Dopo un'ulteriore analisi, il 18 marzo 2025 ha confermato le misure definitive per contrastare le importazioni cinesi a prezzi ingiustamente bassi, che stavano minando il mercato europeo.

I nuovi dazi, calcolati in percentuale sul prezzo CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) alla frontiera dell'Unione, al netto dei dazi, sono fissati al 26,3% per Henan Guangyuan New Material Co., Ltd. (uno dei produttori cinesi coinvolti nell’indagine) e al 56,1% per tutte le altre importazioni dalla Cina.

Le misure riguardano i filati in fibra di vetro, sia ritorti che non ritorti, ma escludono nastri di fibra di vetro, cordoni e filamenti tagliati. Questi materiali sono ampiamente utilizzati nella produzione di tessuti intrecciati, a maglia, intrecciati o senza cuciture, impiegati per rinforzare materiali cementizi (come la malta) o resine elastomeriche, termoplastiche e termoindurenti nell'industria dei compositi. Tra le principali applicazioni figurano componenti per automobili, batterie per veicoli elettrici, camion, autobus, treni, pale eoliche, aeromobili, isolamento edilizio, protezione da fumo e incendi, isolamento acustico, filtrazione (aria, metalli, polveri e liquidi) e isolamento elettrico.

I dazi entreranno in vigore alla data di pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale dell'Unione Europea e resteranno validi per cinque anni, fino al 2030, salvo proroghe o revisioni.

Queste misure fanno parte della strategia dell’UE per contrastare le pratiche commerciali sleali legate all’iniziativa cinese Belt and Road, proteggendo le industrie e i lavoratori europei da distorsioni del mercato e garantendo condizioni di concorrenza eque nel commercio internazionale.

Regulation-on-provisional-duty-_-EU-20242673Download Regulation-on-definitive-duties_EU-2025501Download

GA e Stelva Group are pleased to invite you to the workshop on crucial topics such as environmental sustainability, social justice, and ethical governance.

Imagine a future where art and sustainability come together to create a better world.Discover how art can inspire change and contribute to a fairer and more responsible world.SPEAKERS

Arianna Bonaldo - Lawyer and Chartered Accountant Francesco Cascino - Art Director of Art Thinking Project Andrea Mognon - CFA Head of Asset Management at Banca Zarattini & Co. Carlo Cugnasca - Chartered Accountant, partner Ga Elisabetta Cugnasca - Head of IR Interpump Group and Honorary President AIR

Gianvirgilio Cugini - Moderator, Managing Partner Stelva Group

Register

Workshop-GA-Dialogo-per-un-futuro-sostenibileDownload

The Commission has launched a 4-week call for evidence related to the investment needs of the nuclear power sector in the EU. Seen as an important part of the consultative process and an opportunity for input from stakeholders and the public, the feedback received through this exercise will feed into the Commission’s work in preparing the update of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme (PINC), which is foreseen for publication before the end of 2025. The period to provide feedback is opened until 12 May.

The key objective of the PINC update will be to provide an up-to-date comprehensive, fact-based overview of nuclear energy investments across the EU in line with decarbonisation targets and the REPowerEU and Clean Industrial Deal goals. By covering the full lifecycle of nuclear installations, the programme will identify investment trends, needs, and challenges in the sector, based on objectives pursued by EU countries.

PINC also seeks to stimulate action by stakeholders and facilitate coordinated development of their investments in nuclear energy. In particular, the updated PINC aims to

clarify relevant investment needs for both new-build projects and lifetime extensions of existing reactors identify development and investment needs essential for responsible spent fuel and radioactive waste management and for a robust supply chain provide an overview of innovative nuclear technologies (SMRs, fusion) currently under development in the EU and highlight opportunities and potential challenges associated with developing and deploying them highlight needs associated with key enablers in the nuclear sector, including: (i) national regulatory capacity; (ii) transparency and public engagement; (iii) skills/ workforce gaps; and (iv) international collaboration

The proposed initiative will also seek to document and analyse several key challenges, including

the EU’s retention of its strategic leadership in the global nuclear sector vulnerabilities in the EU supply chain limited market uptake and slow commercialisation of innovative nuclear technologies access to financing  attracting new talent and retraining the existing workforce

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Against Squatting in Barcelona

The Provincial Court of Barcelona has changed its stance regarding squatting and now considers that "cutting off or refusing to pay utilities for squatters who forcefully occupy properties will not constitute a crime of coercion". The courts have also clarified that it must be "verified that the conditions that originally justified the measure stillapply," referring to Real Decreto-ley 11/2020 and Real Decreto-ley 1/2025, which extend the extraordinary suspension of evictions for 'vulnerable' individuals.

However, this change is limited to specific circumstances. First, these measures only apply in cases where the squatter has taken possession by force—they do not apply to tenants who fail to pay rent (which would still constitute coercion). Second, it must be proven that the squatters are not in a vulnerable situation or that their actions amount to'true abuse.' Finally, this ruling only applies in Barcelona and Girona, as the rest of Spain has not yet adopted this legal shift.

The courts are debating the interpretation of the law and the reality faced by citizens. While it is true that some cases of squatting stem from necessity, it is equally true that legitimate property owners often feel abandoned. This is why the decision has been made to protect owners from those who exploit legal loopholes (fraus legis) to takeadvantage of laws originally designed to protect genuinely vulnerable individuals. This could mark the beginning of the end for the government's anti-eviction policies. Time will tell whether this approach spreads to other Spanish courts.

La Commissione Europea ha adottato un nuovo pacchetto di misure di semplificazione (c.d. “Omnibus I e II”) volto a rafforzare la competitività UE e liberare capacità di investimento aggiuntiva, riducendo gli oneri amministrativi di almeno il 25% e quelli per le PMI di almeno il 35%.

Si tratta di una semplificazione di vasta portata nei settori dell’informativa sulla finanza sostenibile, del dovere di diligenza ai fini della sostenibilità, della tassonomia dell’UE, del meccanismo di adeguamento del carbonio alle frontiere, dei programmi di investimento europei.

Più precisamente esso si articola in:

Una proposta di Direttiva che modifica la CSRD (Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive) e la CSDDD (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive); Una proposta (c.d. “Stop the clock”) che posticipa l’applicazione di tutti gli obblighi di rendicontazione previsti dalla CSRD per le imprese tenute a riportare nel 2026 e 2027 (le cosiddette imprese della seconda e terza wave), e che rinvia di un anno – al 2028 – sia il termine di recepimento sia la prima fase di applicazione della CSDDD; Una bozza di atto delegato che modifica gli atti delegati sulla Tassonomia relativi alle informazioni da divulgare e ai criteri climatici e ambientali, attualmente sottoposta a consultazione pubblica; Una proposta di Regolamento che modifica il Regolamento sul Meccanismo di Adeguamento del Carbonio alle Frontiere (C-BAM); Una proposta di Regolamento che modifica il Regolamento InvestEU.

Modifiche agli obblighi di informativa della CSRD e della Tassonomia dell’UE

Concentrare gli obblighi di informativa sulle imprese di più grandi dimensioni e garantire che tali obblighi non si ripercuotano sulle imprese più piccole della catena del valore; Posticipare di due anni (fino al 2028) gli obblighi di informativa per le imprese tenute a comunicare le informazioni a partire dal 2026 o dal 2027 (c.d. seconda e terza wave); Ridurre l’onere degli obblighi di informativa relativa alla Tassonomia dell’UE e limitarlo alle imprese di maggiori dimensioni; Introdurre una soglia di rilevanza finanziaria per la comunicazione in materia di Tassonomia e ridurre di circa il 70% i modelli da utilizzare; Semplificare i criteri del DNSH più complessi per la prevenzione e la riduzione dell’inquinamento in relazione all’uso e alla presenza di sostanze chimiche; Adeguare l’indicatore Green Asset Ratio (GAR): le banche potranno escludere dal denominatore del GAR le esposizioni relative a imprese che non rientrano nell’ambito di applicazione futuro della CSRD.

Semplificazione degli obblighi di dovuta diligenza della CSDDD

Concentrare gli obblighi di dovuta diligenza sui partner commerciali diretti (sono dunque esclusi quelli indiretti); Portare da 1 a 5 anni la frequenza delle valutazioni periodiche e del monitoraggio dei partner commerciali; Limitare la quantità di informazioni che possono essere richieste alle PMI da parte delle grandi imprese nell’ambito della mappatura della catene di valore; Rinvio di un anno (26 luglio 2028) per le imprese obbligate ad adottare gli obblighi di dovuta diligenza entro il 2027, ossia le imprese con oltre 5.000 dipendenti e fatturato netto a livello mondiale superiore a 1.500.000.000 EUR nell’ultimo esercizio precedente al 26 luglio 2027; Anticipare di un anno l’adozione delle linee guida (luglio 2026); Modificare le condizioni di responsabilità civile dell’UE.

Semplificazione del meccanismo CBAM

Al fine di esentare i piccoli importatori dagli obblighi CBAM (per lo più PMI e persone fisiche), viene fissata una nuova soglia annua cumulativa CBAM pari a 50 tonnellate per importatore; Generale semplificazione delle norme, comprese quelle relative al calcolo delle emissioni incorporate e gli obblighi di rendicontazione e rafforzamento delle norme contro le elusioni e gli abusi; Estensione dell’ambito di applicazione del CBAM, in particolare alle merci a valle, attraverso una nuova proposta legislativa all’inizio del 2026.

A multilevel action in support of exporting companies General Introduction

The tariff measures enacted by the United States have had a direct impact on a number of strategic European sectors. In particular, the following industries have been subjected to duties:

automobiles and auto parts, facing tariffs up to 25 percent under Section 232; steel and aluminum products, with duties of 25 percent and 10 percent respectively; agri-food products (wines, cheeses, olive oil), subject to additional duties; manufactured goods, mechanical and electronic equipment.

The full list is available through  the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and is categorized by the customs classification (HS Code) and preferential origin of the product.

With the announcement by the U.S. administration  of new across-the-board tariffs on imports - including a 10 percent tariff on all imported goods and an additional 20 percent tariff on goods originating from the European Union - a new phase of systemic tension in international trade has begun. These measures, introduced under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, reflect an increasingly  unilateral direction in U.S. trade policy.

This situation has been further exacerbated by the recent U.S. decision to notify its withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO) under Article XVI:5 of the Marrakesh Agreement. This decision entails the end of U.S. adherence to multilateral trade obligations, renders the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) inapplicable to the United States and undermines  the multilateral framework for legal protection in trade.

Audit and preventive risk management

In response, European companies must promptly initiate an internal audit to assess tariff exposure and verify the legal robustness of their international trade agreements. The audit should include:

analyzing the economic impact of duties on individual customs items; assessing the possibility of transferring the tariff burden; reviewing existing contractual clauses (hardship clauses, change in law, price revision); reclassifying customs origins and evaluating potential supply chain restructuring. I. Public Enforcement – Institutional Action

1. At the level of the European Union:

The European Union has several regulatory tools at its disposal to respond to discriminatory or coercive measures by third countries:

Regulation (EU) 2021/167 empowers the EU to adopt autonomous countermeasures in cases of violations of international obligations; Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 (anti-coercion instrument) enables the EU to address coercive practices through actions such as duties, exclusion from public procurement and other measures; Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 (FSR - Foreign Subsidies Regulation) allows the EU to counter the distorting effects of foreign subsidies in procurement and investment contexts.

These instruments can be activated following the collection of economic and legal evidence from businesses, in coordination with national authorities and with the political support of both the EU Parliament and the Council. Specifically, Article 13 of the ACI (Anti-Coercion Instrument) governs a particularly targeted information gathering mechanism involving, inter alia, businesses (Art.13.2 "For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Commission shall inform and consult stakeholders, in particular associations acting on behalf of Union economic operators and trade unions, that could be affected by potential Union response measures, and Member State’ authorities involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation that regulates the sectors that could be affected by those measures.").

II. Private Enforcement - Individual Protection

Businesses may bring jurisdictional actions against U.S. authorities:

before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), where they may challenge the legality of imposed duties under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commerce Clause; before the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), by requesting sector-specific determinations regarding the impact of tariff measures; through class actions brought by affected importers or consortia.

Notable precedents include Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States (2020), where the ITC annulled duties due to a violation of the separation of powers, and Aluminum Association v. United States (2021), which addressed breaches of the APA.

In addition to domestic legal remedies, European companies may invoke international protection instruments, drawing on international trade and investment agreements (FTAs and IIAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the ICSID Convention of 1965. Although the Italy-U.S. BIT has been rescinded, some European companies may still rely on BITs still in force signed by EU member states, such as the Netherlands or Germany, thus benefiting from a “multilevel structure”. Moreover, it is possible that Italian economic operators have invested in the United States via companies incorporated in Canada or Mexico: they may be eligible to invokethe UMSCA agreement (in effect since 1 July 2023). Arbitration may be triggered in cases involving measures equivalent to indirect expropriation, breach of fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard or discriminatory actions.

Relevant precedents include:

Metalclad v. Mexico: an environmental measure deemed equivalent to an expropriation; CMS v. Argentina: violation of the FET standard due to extraordinary regulatory measures; Occidental v. Ecuador: arbitrary revocation of an oil concession which was considered an act of expropriation. Vento Motorcycles Inc. v. Mexico (6 July 2020): a joint venture established in Mexico by U.S. investors and adversely affected by Mexican duties (the so-called trade-related measures) was found to be a protected investment under NAFTA (now replaced by the UMSCA).

Where an investment takes the form of a stable presence (e.g. joint venture, subsidiary, establishment), or involves an economic transaction of a certain duration (through corporate interests and contractual rights), arbitration offers an effective and complementary tool to administrative or jurisdictional remedies.

III. International Arbitration and Bilateral Treaties

1. Investor-State Arbitrations:

European companies with investments in the U.S. may resort to arbitration procedures based on bilateral treaties (BITs). While the 1983 Italy-US BIT was terminated in 2013, it provides a 10-year sunset clause that could still cover investments made prior to its termination. Certain BITs concluded by other EU member states (e.g., Netherlands, Germany) remain in force and may offer indirect access to ISDS protection.

Noteworthy ICSID precedents include Metalclad v. Mexico and CMS v. Argentina, which reaffirmed the principle that states can be held liable for measures equivalent to indirect expropriation or violation of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard.

IV. Systemic and administrative impacts

1. Impact on public administrations:

Contracting authorities may have to deal with price increases on goods subject to duties, requests for revised fees, or litigation. Additionally, they must reassess the eligibility of U.S. operators, who no longer meet the reciprocity requirements.

2. Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR):

Non-EU companies benefitting from government subsidies may face exclusion from procurement processes or scrutiny in merger transactions. The FSR represents a strategic enforcement tool in the current post-WTO landscape.

V. Customs classification and rules of origin

When a product originating in the EU is exported to the United States and subsequently undergoes processing, it is crucial to determine whether that processing is sufficient to alter the product’s customs origin. According to the principles of international customs law and the World Customs Organization (WCO) regulations, a change in origin occurs when a “substantial transformation” takes place, which implies a change in the customs heading at the HS code level (so-called “heading jump rule”).

If the processing carried out in the US qualifies as substantial:

the final product may be considered to have US origin; this may affect its eligibility for tariff benefits upon reimportation into the EU (e.g., under preferential rules of origin); there is a risk of double taxation both upon entry into the U.S. and upon return to the EU, if no customs relief mechanism is available.

If, on the other hand, the processing is merely incidental (e.g., simple packaging or assembly), the product retains its EU origin. Therefore, companies must conduct documentary audits, obtain certificates of origin and carry out detailed technical assessments to prevent risks of disputes and double taxation.

Accurate determination of both the customs code (HS code) and the origin of goods is critical in determining duty liability. In the case of export to the US and subsequent processing, it is essential to determine whether such processing is sufficient to result in a change of origin. The absence of preferential post-processing agreements pose risks of double taxation and requires accurate traceability.

Conclusions

The erosion of the multilateral trade system and the adoption of discriminatory measures by the U.S. call for an integrated approach, based on internal audits, EU enforcement actions, contractual instruments and international arbitration procedures. Only through effective coordination among economic operators, public institutions and European authorities can the economic interests of both States and the EU as a whole be adequately protected.

Miscellaneous

The Ministry of the Popular Power for Transportation, through a Resolution, decided to establish, regulate, and implement the rates of the services and activities connected to the aquatic sector and of the ground transportation service provided by the National institute of Aquatic Spaces (Instituto Nacional de los Espacios Acuáticos) and the natural or legal persons duly authorized to provide services in the ship-port interface established in said Resolution. Resolution No. 033, published in Official Gazette of 05/03/2018, and Resolution No. 022, published in Official Gazette of 05/28/2020, are repealed. Any rule with an equal or lower status that conflicts with the Resolution is repealed. (Official Gazette of 02/13/2025. Resolution No. 052. Entry into force: Upon publication in the Official Gazette).

A Presidential Decree issued the Partial Regulations to the Decree with the Status, Value, and Force of Organic Law that Reserves to the State the Activities of Exploration and Exploitation of Gold and other Strategic Minerals, in relation to Mining Brigades. Said Regulations rule the matters concerning Mining Brigades as a form of organization of natural persons intended for the exercise of activities of exploration, exploitation, preparation, possession, circulation, and transportation exercised by small-scale mining. (Official Gazette of 02/24/2025. Decree No. 5.097. Entry into force: Upon publication in the Official Gazette).

The Superintendence of Public Property (Superintendencia de Bienes Públicos - SUDEBIP) issued the rules applicable to the periodic review of public property lease agreements. The purpose of said rules is to establish the guidelines that are applicable to the periodic review of lease agreements of the personal or real property categorized as public property that is assigned to or owned by the agencies and entities of the Public Sector and of that in which the agencies and entities of the Public Sector act as lessees.

Said rules provide as follows:

The agencies and entities of the Public Sector and the natural or legal persons that give under lease a personal or real property categorized as public property must notify it through an official letter to the SUDEBIP. The enterprises or companies with a mixed capital in which the Public Sector has an interest lower than 50% of the corporate capital must send to the SUDEBIP the inventory list of the personal or real property categorized as public property given under lease. The SUDEBIP may require that the private institutions, as well as the individuals, that in the capacity as lessees have custody of or possess personal or real property categorized as public property provide it with the data and reports that it deems necessary and that they send to the SUDEBIP the records or inventories of said property. The public property categorized as property of the public domain is excluded from the application of the rules.

(Official Gazette of 02/26/2025. Administrative Ruling No. 007. Entry into force: Upon publication in the Official Gazette).

GA is proud to have conducted a groundbreaking study on antitrust remedies, which has played a key role in shaping the discussion at the Online Expert Workshop on Antitrust Remedies, organized by the European Commission’s DG Competition on March 27, 2025.

The study was prepared by a consortium led by the law firm GA and the economic consultancy Nera supported by monitoring trustee Thomas Hoehn and Prof. Peter Whelan. The study’s significance and impact led the Commission to dedicate an entire high-level event to examining its findings, bringing together experts, academics, and policymakers to assess the effectiveness of antitrust remedies and their enforcement in practice.

On 20 February 2025 DG Competition has published a new ex post evaluation study on the effectiveness of antitrust remedies imposed or accepted by the European Commission over the past 20 years under Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation 1/2003.

The ex post evaluation of twelve significant remedy cases suggests:

While most remedies were fully implemented, fewer than half in the selected sample were fully effective in achieving their goal. Purely behavioral remedies were less likely to be both fully implemented and effective than other forms of remedies. Implementation and effectiveness seem to have improved over time.

Further findings and the recommendations are provided in a factsheet.

The study was prepared by a consortium led by the law firm GA and the economic consultancy Nera supported by monitoring trustee Thomas Hoehn and Prof. Peter Whelan.

DG Competition will host on 27 March 2025 an expert online workshop with the authors of the study and leading experts on antitrust remedies to discuss both the findings and the recommendations of the study. The Webex link will be shared with participants a few days before the event.

Register

Programme

12:00 Welcome, Thomas Deisenhofer (DG Competition)  12:05 – 12:45 Presentation of the study by the authors Francesco Sciaudone  Nicola Tosini  Thomas Hoehn   12:45 – 13:25 Expert discussion on the main findings and recommendations of the studyModerator: Damien Gerard (Belgian competition authority)  13:25 – 13:30 Concluding remarks, Thomas Deisenhofer (DG Competition)

The concept of sustainability is becoming increasingly tangible, both for businesses and at the national and European levels. Acting according to an ESG strategy is no longer just an ethical choice but a necessity for corporate survival and competitiveness.

Authorities are working to create and expand a regulatory framework aimed at providing clear rules, common objectives, a uniform market, and fair competition at both national and international levels.

From the Sustainable Development Goals to corporate social responsibility, what are the obligations for companies, and what strategic opportunities and benefits do they offer? What is the current regulatory framework, and what new developments are on the horizon?

Register

25 March 2025 - 15:00

Sustainability is no longer just an ethical choice but a strategic lever for corporate competitiveness.Our Partner, Gianluigi Serafini, will analyze the ESG regulatory framework and the opportunities for businesses.

Agenda

ESG Regulations: Obligations and Opportunities for Companies Corporate Governance and Compliance Sustainable Transition: Tools and Strategies

What is the Clean Industrial Deal?

Initiative of the European Commission Aims to transform decarbonization into a growth driver for European industries Seeks to combine climate and competitiveness Main focus on energy-intensive industries and the Clean-Tech sector Priority on circularity – the EU aims to be a leader by 2030 Six business drivers: Affordable energy Lead markets Financing Circularity and access to materials Global markets and international partnerships Skills

Access to affordable energy

Foundation of competitiveness Prices in Europe are much higher compared to trading partners The EU must advance to a fully integrated single energy market An Action Plan for Affordable Energy is adopted with goals: Lowering energy bills through agreements, counter guarantees, lower taxes, building networks, and state aid Accelerating the rollout of clean energy and electrification by cutting permitting times for the deployment of the grid, energy storage, and renewables projects with concrete measures in the upcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act Ensuring well-functioning gas markets, as the price of imported natural gas directly impacts gas and electricity prices. Therefore, a Gas Market Task Force was set up to scrutinize markets, and gas storage refilling will be better coordinated

Lead markets

Concrete measures are required on the demand side too, and the CID will put in measures for the demand to emerge Non-price criteria in public procurement and incentives for private purchases The future Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act (IDAA) will introduce resilience and sustainability criteria to foster clean European supply in energy-intensive sectors The IDAA will develop a voluntary label on the carbon intensity content of industrial products based on methodology with ETS data with ongoing revision of the CBAM methodology Promote the uptake of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen Hydrogen has a central role in decarbonizing the EU energy system. The Commission will soon adopt a delegated act on low-carbon hydrogen

Public and private investments

The clean transition will require major investments. The EU needs to increase annual investments in energy, industry, and transport systems by around 480 billion EUR compared to the previous decade. Mobilizing and leveraging private capital are key. Strengthening EU-level funding The Innovation Fund has proven reliable for financing industrial decarbonization. The Commission will also propose a facility for industrial decarbonization based on the ETS Leveraging private investment InvestEU is the main EU-level tool to leverage private funding. The Commission is putting forward an amendment to increase its risk-bearing capacity. Work with the EIB on new initiatives will also take place. Clean Industry State Aid Framework Simplified rules will allow quick approval of state aid measures for decarbonization and clean-tech projects. Tax policies should not give fossil fuels an advantage over clean energy. Tax measures will be paired with further actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies.

Circularity

Europe should be more strategic about procuring critical raw materials to drastically reduce exposure to unreliable suppliers and prevent supply disruptions Fast implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act The Commission will set up a demand aggregation and matchmaking mechanism for critical raw materials As a second step, the Commission will set up a dedicated EU Critical Raw Material Centre Circular economy The Commission will adopt a Circular Economy Act in 2026, which will accelerate the circular transition enabling the free movement of circular products, secondary raw materials, and waste

Global markets

Achieving the objectives of the CID is closely linked to the ability to act internationally. The EU cannot realize its clean industrialization objectives without partnerships on the global stage. Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships The EU continues to sign, conclude, and fully implement pending Free Trade Agreements and takes forward ongoing negotiations for new ones. Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs) will complement these agreements Improving the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) ensures that the EU’s industry emission abatement efforts are not undermined by carbon-intensive imports of goods produced outside the EU and incentivizes decarbonization and carbon pricing globally. In the second half of 2025, a comprehensive review of CBAM will be presented Promoting and protecting EU industry The EU needs to remain an attractive place to do business. The Commission will adopt guidelines by January 2026 on key concepts underpinning the Foreign Subsidies Regulation The Commission will continue to make fast and efficient use of Trade Defence Instruments such as anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties where necessary

Skills and quality jobs

Every person, community, and business should benefit from the clean transition. CID therefore commits to delivering quality jobs Skills and quality jobs Industry needs better access to skills. The Commission will lay out a Union of Skills as an overarching skills strategy to support the development of a more resilient and adaptable education A Skills Portability Initiative will help ensure that a skill acquired in one country is recognized in another Supporting workers in transition To support workers in transition, the Commission will create a European Fair Transition Observatory The Commission will assess if the use of training and skills conditionalities for public support of the industrial transition can be increased Social leasing for clean products To ensure all Europeans benefit from the clean transition without adverse distributional effects and to help stimulate demand for clean products, the Commission will develop Guidance to Member States on social leasing for electric vehicles, heat pumps, and other clean products.

Implementing CID across sectors

The CID will serve as a framework for engaging in a dialogue with industries to develop sectoral transition pathways The Industrial Action Plan for the Automotive Sector will be adopted on March 5th. A steel and metals action plan will also be launched in March. A Chemicals Industry Package set for adoption in late 2025 will recognize the strategic role of the chemicals sector as the industry of industries and propose initiatives for the sector’s competitiveness. A Sustainable Transport Investment Plan will outline short-term measures to support specific renewable and low-carbon fuels for aviation and waterborne transport. The Commission will also propose a Bioeconomy Strategy to improve resource efficiency and tap the significant growth potential of biobased materials substituting fossil-based materials.

Reactions

"I am not sure how quickly the Deal can drive down energy prices," said Elisabetta Cornago, a senior research fellow at the think tank CEPS. The draft text acknowledged that gas will be the price-setter for power prices for years to come, and here Bruegel's research analyst Conall Heussaff sees a structural problem. Europe relies almost entirely on gas imports which are “always going to be expensive,” he said, citing the extra costs of liquefying and transporting gas compared to the US, which directly extracts its own shale gas and uses it domestically. The experts all believed that more renewables and an integrated European grid will ultimately reduce prices, but this will not happen anytime soon. Heussaff sees this shift happening in the 2030s.

1. Introduction to Mercosur

The Southern Common Market, commonly known by the Spanish abbreviation Mercosur, is a regional trade bloc founded in 1991 that currently includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

The goal of Mercosur is that of promoting free trade and economic integration among its members, as well as between its members and third countries. For this purpose, Mercosur enters into specific bilateral agreements, called Economic Complementation Agreements (ACE), such as those entered by other South American countries like Peru, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Such agreements generally entail tariff reductions on goods traded between the signatory countries, rules of origin, and trade facilitation measures, including customs procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Interestingly, Mercosur:

has 268 million consumers (not considering ACE countries); accounts for approximately 70% of South America’s GDP; and its key sectors of production include (i) agriculture (meat, dairy products and fruits); (ii) industry (automotive and machinery) and (iii) services (financial, telecommunications and IT). 2. The relations between Mercosur and the European Union until now

Mercosur is a big market for EU exports and, until now, it was the only major trading partner in Latin America with which the EU lacked a preferential trade agreement. At the same time, the EU is Mercosur’s second-biggest good trading partner, after China and ahead of the United States.

The thriving nature of the trade relations between Mercosur and the EU is represented in the following table.

EUMercosurTrade in Goods (2023)Exports to Mercosur: €55.7 billionExports to EU: €53.7 billionTrade in Services (2022)Exports to Mercosur: €28.2 billionExports to EU: €12.3 billionTop Export CategoriesMachinery and appliances (26.7%)Chemicals and pharmaceuticals (25%)Transport equipment (11.9%)Mineral products(29.6%)Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco (19.2%)Vegetable products (17.9%)

Despite the above, Mercosur’s economies are highly protected, and European firms face many trade barriers when exporting there, which makes it hard for them to compete under fair conditions. These barriers include, among other, high import duties, burdensome procedures, as well as technical regulations and standards, which differ from international ones.

3. The EU-Mercosur Agreement

The negotiations for a comprehensive trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur were launched in June 1999. After a suspension, talks resumed in 2010. The protracted negotiations gained renewed momentum in 2016, and, in 2019, the European Union and Mercosur concluded the talks following new tariff-reduction offers.

Eventually, on December 6, 2024, both parties reached a political agreement to enhance the deal and address concerns related to sustainable development (the “EU-Mercosur Agreement” or more generally the “Agreement”).

The Agreement, which is composed of a political and cooperation pillar and a trade pillar, has not come into force yet. The conclusion of negotiations marks only the first step in the process toward finalizing the Agreement (see, Section 5 below).

In terms of content, the Agreement addresses several issues. Its key themes include:

Market Access – The Agreement foresees significant reductions in tariffs, especiallyin key sectors (like those of automobiles, chemicals, and raw materials), with a focus on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Services – To open new opportunities for growth and enhance competition, broader access will be granted to service providers across industries such as telecommunications, financial services, and transport. Sustainability and Environment – In the context of their shared environmental goals, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Paris Agreement, with specific attention to deforestation and sustainable trade practices. The Agreement could also be suspended if these goals are not met. Agriculture and Food – One of the most pressing issues is the regulation of agricultural products, a pivotal area that influences not only the future of EU farmers but also the protection of sensitive sectors and the safeguarding of rigorous food safety standards. Rules of origin and Intellectual Property – To safeguard respective products and sensitive markets, the Agreement regulates the protection of Geographical Indications (e.g. Parmesan and Champagne) and the harmonization of technical standards. It also enhances intellectual property protections. Government Procurement – With the aim of creating new opportunities and a stronger collaboration, the two blocs are opening government procurement markets, enabling companies to bid for public contracts in each other’s regions. Social Rights – The parties assessed the economic, social, and human rights impacts of the Agreement’s trade provisions, ensuring that neither side can promote trade or investment by ignoring or failing to enforce labour laws and social impacts. Dispute Resolution – The commitments on Trade and Sustainable Development will be enforceable through a dispute settlement mechanism involving an independent panel of experts, civil society participation (including employers and trade unions), and the expertise of international bodies. Economic and Political Cooperation – Political dialogue and cooperation will be further strengthened in areas such as migration, green technologies, raw material sourcing, research, and the fight against money laundering and cybercrime. Review and Monitoring –Regular reviews of the Agreement’s impact are to be conducted, incorporating stakeholder input to ensure transparency and facilitate progress.

The most significant key issues under the Agreement are (i) tariff reductions and their implementation timelines (see Sub-Section 3.1 below); (ii) sustainability and environmental protection commitments (see Sub-Section 3.2 below); and (iii) changes in services and professional mobility (see Sub-Section 3.3 below).

3.1. What types of tariff reductions are provided for under the Agreement?

Mercosur’s starting tariff levels are considerable[1] and EU tariffs are also very high, especially on agri-food products[2]. Therefore, EU-Mercosur Agreement establishes a tariff elimination schedule, gradually liberalizing trade across various sectors with specific timelines and percentages for different products.

Generally, the Agreement eliminates tariffs on more than 90% of bilateral trade. Under the Agreement, the EU would indeed remove import duties on 92% of Mercosur goods exported to the EU, while  Mercosur would eliminate customs duties on 91% of EU goods exports to Mercosur.

Under the Agreement, depending on the product type, tariff reductions are implemented in the form of (i) immediate tariff eliminations (i.e. elimination within the first year); (ii)    gradual reductions (i.e. reduction over a period of 4 to 10 years); or (iii) quota reductions (i.e., phased-in reductions over periods ranging from 5 to 10 years depending on the product).

For example:

Industrial Goods – The EU will eliminate duties on all industrial goods over a transitional period of up to 10 years. Tariffs on EU cars and automotive parts will be eliminated over a period of 18, 25, and 30 years, depending on the specific product, making it easier for European firms to export to Mercosur countries. Agricultural Products – The EU will liberalize 82% of Mercosur agricultural imports and Mercosur will remove tariffs on 93% of tariff lines for EU exports. For some products, the Agreement introduces tariff rate quotas (TRQs), allowing a specified volume of imports at reduced tariff rates. Once these quotas are filled, the standard tariffs will apply.

High tariffs on EU agri-food exports will be removed. This includes key products like olive oil, wine, malt. For some dairy products, zero duties will gradually apply within quotas. The EU will grant very limited access to its market to imports of agri-food products. For sensitive products like beef, poultry or sugar, access to the EU market will be limited through gradually implemented quotas (beef: a quota of 99,000 tonnes, subject to a 7.5% duty; poultry: quota of 180,000 tonnes, phased in over five years; sugar: duty-free quota of 180,000 tonnes).

Lastly, a bilateral safeguard clause can be applied in case increased imports cause or even only threaten to cause serious injury to the relevant sectors.

Raw materials – The deal will lower EU tariffs on critical raw materials and their processed products, making exports to the EU easier and imports cheaper. It will also eliminate tariff escalation, incentivizing Mercosur to develop local production of value-added products. Brazil will retain some taxes on exports of certain materials, but the EU would benefit from a ceiling on them. For Argentina, all export taxes on minerals are waived. 3.2. What are the sustainability and environmental protection commitments included in the Agreement?

Under the Agreement, with regards to sustainability and environmental protection, the EU and Mercosur:

Commit to implementing the United Nations Framework Convention and the Paris Agreement on climate change, with possible suspension of benefits if a party does not do so. Undertake to support existing climate and environmental standards and not lower or dilute them. The Agreement prohibits either side from encouraging trade and investment by derogations from or not enforcing environmental laws. Commit to promote sustainable fisheries and sustainable forest management, among others. The deal will also open opportunities for supply chains of products that are produced in a way that helps conserve the environment.

The commitments on trade and sustainable development will be enforceable through a dispute settlement mechanism that includes (i) external review by an independent panel of experts, (ii) role for civil society at all stages, and (iii) calling on the expertise of international bodies.

3.3. What will the Agreement mean for services and investments?

The Agreement will make it easier for EU companies to offer their services in Mercosur and vice versa, whether by setting up locally or providing services across borders. Additionally, it will reduce discrimination and create new opportunities for service providers and investors from both regions.

Many sectors, such as business services, financial services, telecommunications, maritime transport, and postal and courier services, are expected to benefit from these measures.

The EU and Mercosur will still regulate their service markets fairly and without discrimination and the Agreement will not liberalize public services like healthcare or state-funded education. Furthermore, it will ensure that regulators, both foreign and domestic, can continue to establish and enforce non-discriminatory rules to protect health, safety, the environment, and consumers while ensuring high-quality services and workers’ rights.

4.The Economic Impact Expected to Originate from the Agreement

The EU-Mercosur Agreement is expected to significantly increase bilateral trade by up to 37% in the long term, while the negative effect on trade with other regions will be limited[3]. Several studies have assessed the Agreement’s impact on GDP, with one predicting a €10.9 billion increase for the EU (0.1% of GDP) and a €7.4 billion one for MERCOSUR (0.3% of GDP) by 2032[4].

4.1. What are the benefits for European companies investing under the Agreement?

European companies stand to gain several advantages from the Agreement, namely:

Significant cost savings – The removal of high Mercosur tariffs will result in over €4 billion in annual savings on customs duties for EU exporters. Streamlined exports – The immediate tariff elimination for approximately 70% of goods will facilitate smoother market entry. Moreover, simplified and more efficient customs procedures will reduce administrative burdens and improve the speed of trade. Access to a large market – The Agreement will open access to a combined market of more than 700 million consumers (Mercosur and EU together), enhancing opportunities for expansion. Support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – The Agreement includes a section focused on helping SMEs with the specific challenges they face in trade and investment. This is important, as over 30,000 European SMEs currently export to Mercosur, and this number is likely to increase due to easier market access. Equal access to public contracts – EU companies will be able to bid for public contracts on the same terms as Mercosur businesses. Sector-specific opportunities – The Agreement will open substantial opportunities for EU companies in key sectors such as the automotive industry. Employment and economic growth – Increased foreign investments are expected to drive job creation and economic development. Encouragement of strategic investments – The Agreement will promote investments in South America’s infrastructure and sustainable technologies, creating new opportunities for European companies. Political and strategic advantages – The Agreement will fortify political and economic relations with Latin America, offering a strategic response to rising global protectionism. It will ensure long-term stability by preventing discriminatory trade practices and creating a more predictable and secure environment for both EU and Mercosur businesses. 4.2. What are the benefits for medium-sized European companies partnering with Mercosur firms?

In addition to the benefits already mentioned, medium-sized European companies partnering with Mercosur firms will also gain a range of additional advantages:

Full access to resources – The Agreement provides preferential access to critical raw materials and green goods, strengthening supply chains and competitiveness. Stronger competitiveness – Improved standards in areas such as intellectual property and environmental protection ensure compliance and predictability, while investment incentives promote local operations, boosting competitiveness. Opportunities for collaboration and innovation – The Agreement encourages joint ventures with local companies, leading to innovative products tailored for local markets. Support for sustainable practices – By aligning with sustainability goals, the Agreement helps enhance brand reputation and strengthens the corporate social responsibility profile. 5. The ratification process and the entry into force of the Agreement

The ratification process for the EU-Mercosur Agreement involves several complex stages. Specifically:

, after initial approval, the Agreement must be ratified by the parliaments of all four Mercosur countries (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) as each country has its own legislative process. , the process is more complex.

The text of the Agreement was published on the European Commission’s website, and it will now be checked by lawyer linguists and translatedinto all official EU languages.

Then, the Commission will transmit a proposal to the Council (where EU countries are represented by their Trade Ministers) and the Parliament for the signature and conclusion of the Agreement. This stage requires a qualified majority: 55% of Member States (15) representing at least 65% of the EU population must be in favour. It means that a minimum of four States representing at least 35% of the EU population could block the Agreement.

Lastly, the Agreement must be ratified by the national parliaments of all 27 EU member states.

The legal structure of any final EU-Mercosur deal, and therefore the ratification procedure, will be decided only after the negotiations between the EU Institutions are completed. Two main models are likely to be used:

In the most optimistic scenario, the full ratification process is expected to take between 12 to 18 months as of the signing date, which is not known yet. However, delays are a frequent challenge in trade agreements. To put it into perspective, it took about nine years for the agreement between the European Union and Canada to be fully ratified from its signing in 2014 until final approvals were completed in 2023. For the purpose of clarity, signing an international treaty does not give it any legal force, only its ratification does.

6. The Challenges and Opposition Faced by the Agreement

The EU-Mercosur Agreement was reached in December 2024, but there are still significant challenges and obstacles before it can take effect. Along the complex signing and ratification process, political tensions in EU play a critical role. Indeed, some EU countries are concerned about the impact on local industries (especially agriculture) and the environment, and this is leading to political divisions. These divisions could make the ratification process more difficult and may result in further delays.

6.1. What are the political tensions originated by the Agreement inside the EU?

The Agreement has caused major political tensions within the European Union. Specifically:

Supporters – The European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, Germany and Spain strongly support the Agreement, which would diversify trade and strengthen their economies, seeing it as an important achievement and a geopolitical win.

The Agreement is expected to bolster the German automotive sector (Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes-Benz) and chemicals industry (companies like Bayer), by reducing tariffs and opening markets in South America.

Spain is predicted to gain from the deal, with its manufacturing, chemicals, and pharmaceutical sectors benefitting. Exports are expected to grow by 37%, boosting GDP by 0.23% and creating jobs.

Critics – Numerous aspects of the deal have given rise to objections, but two issues stand out: farming and the environment. France is strongly against it since it worries that cheap imports, like poultry and beef, could harm its farmers. Paris has gathered support from other countries, including Poland, Austria, and Ireland (the latter is the fifth-largest beef exporter in the world), to block the deal unless certain conditions are met. The Netherlands and Belgium have only expressed reservations about the deal.

European farmers (particularly from France, Ireland, Belgium and Poland) fear unfair competition, especially from beef, poultry, and sugar imports, which could be produced at lower costs in Mercosur countries, where food safety, animal welfare, and environmental regulations are less stringent. The stricter EU standards make farmers in the EU face higher costs. They also point out that cattle in Mercosur countries may be treated with hormones or chemicals that are banned in the EU. There are also concerns about the possible environmental effects of the deal, especially related to deforestation in the Amazon rainforest because of the higher demand for products like beef and soy.

Middle Ground – Italy stands in the middle, acknowledging potential benefits for industries like automotive, engineering, fashion, and regional foods (e.g. Parmesan cheese). However, there are also concerns regarding the broader economic implications, especially for sectors that could face competition from the Agreement. Remarkably, Italy, as a large EU Member State, could have enough voting power to stop the Agreement or allow it to prosper at the European level. 6.2.  What strategies are being considered to facilitate ratification?

The Commission is examining the opportunity of splitting the EU-Mercosur Agreement into two separate agreements: one covering only the areas of exclusive EU competence and the other covering areas of mixed competence with Member States[5].

In Mercosur’s case, the EU might consider separating the political and cooperation agreement, including issues like labour standards, the environment, and transport, from the main trade agreement that would require only a simple majority for approval. The idea is to approve the parts within the exclusive EU competence, allowing some trade benefits to be enjoyed sooner.

However, splitting the Agreement could weaken the deal’s overall impact and ambition. Also, Mercosur might not agree to splitting the deal and may prefer a single, comprehensive agreement.

7. Conclusions

Mercosur is a dynamic economic bloc, and the EU-Mercosur Agreement represents a significant opportunity for EU and Mercosur companies to expand their business operations in Latin America, respectively Europe.

As a short summary of things, if and when fully ratified, the Agreement will remove over 90% of tariffs between the two regions, offering annual savings of €4 billion, particularly benefiting sectors like automotive, machinery, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. It also encourages investments in infrastructure and sustainable technologies, thereby enhancing competitiveness across various sectors. Finally, the Agreement is also a pioneering deal for sustainability, with commitments to combat climate change, deforestation, and uphold workers’ rights.

In summary, the combination of market access, cost savings, and potential for growth makes investing in Mercosur an attractive option for European companies looking to diversify their operations and capitalize on emerging opportunities in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

Useful links

Text of the Agreement: link

European Commission website on EU-Mercosur Agreement: link

Questions and answers on the EU-Mercosur Agreement: link

Factsheets and guides on the EU-Mercosur Agreement: link

Sincere gratitude is extended to José María Allonca, Leticia Mariz Schweizer,

Stefano Bianchi, and Chiara Pieraccini for their significant contribution to this informative document

[1] The tariffs are up to 35% on automobiles, 18% on components, 20% on machinery, 18% on chemicals, 14% on pharmaceuticals and 35% on clothing and footwear; in agriculture, up to 28% on dairy products, 25% on beverages and soft drinks, 27% on wines and 20% on confectionery.

[2] For instance, the EU tariffs are, up to 35% on wines, 20% on alcoholic beverages, and compound tariffs equivalent to an ad valorem rate of up to 62% on out-of-quota meat.

[3] Real Instituto Elcano. (2020). Why does Latin America matter? Elcano Royal Institute. Available at: link.

[4] LSE Consulting. (2020). Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of the Association Agreement negotiations between the EU and Mercosur: Final report. London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: link.

[5] Martin, D., & Ford, G. (2025, January 15). Commission plans for Mercosur deal split may not pass Parliament test. Borderlex. Available at: link.

From April 6, 2025, the United Kingdom may abolish the tax regime for non-domiciled residents (Res Non Dom), replacing it with a new special 4-year regime.

Starting from the fifth year, all residents may be subject to ordinary taxation on global income, prompting many taxpayers to consider relocating to countries with more favorable tax regimes.

During the meeting, we will analyze the possible changes of the reform, relocation opportunities for High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) in Switzerland and Italy, which offer similar flat-rate regimes, and the latest news based on the positions taken by the UK Government.

Agenda

16:30 – 17:00 Welcome and workshop presentation 17:00 – 17:20 Possible abolition of the Res Non Dom regime in light of recent positions taken by the UK Government 17:20 – 17:40 The alternative expenditure-based tax regime in Switzerland 17:40 – 18:10 The regime for new residents under Article 24-bis of the Italian TUIR as provided by the Italian decree 18:10 – 18:30 Round table discussion

Speakers

Arianna Bonaldo, GA Switzerland – Stelva Group Vincenzo Borelli, GA United Kingdom Carlo Cugnasca, GA Italy

On 9 April 2025, the European Commission presented the AI Continent Action Plan to make EU a world leader in artificial intelligence (AI). The idea was first shared by President Ursula von der Leyen at a major AI summit in Paris earlier this year but now we have the details.

The Action Plan rests on five pillars: infrastructure, data access, adoption in key sectors, talent development and regulatory simplification. Together, they form a comprehensive roadmap for strengthening the EU’s position in the rapidly evolving global AI landscape.

A closer examination of these pillars reveals further details.

Building a large-scale AI data and computing infrastructure

Key takeaway:

13 AI Factories are already under deployment across Member States. EU will also help establishing up to 5 AI gigafactories with approximately 100,000 state-of-the-art AI chips, four times more than current AI factories. InvestAI will mobilise €20 billion in public-private investment to build up to 5 Gigafactories. Call for Expression of Interest was launched for potential consortia and will close on 20 June.

At the heart of the plan is a significant investment in AI infrastructure. The EU is setting up AI Factories next to Europe’s most powerful supercomputers. These centres will help startups, researchers, and businesses build AI systems and test new ideas.

The Commission also wants to build AI Gigafactories. These will have around 100,000 advanced AI chips, four times more than the AI Factories, and the goal is to train the most powerful AI models in the world. The EU will invest €20 billion to support up to five of these new Gigafactories. A call for expression of interest for interested consortia was published and will be open until 20 June 2025, 17h00.

This physical expansion will be accompanied by a new legislative proposal: the Cloud and AI Development Act for which a public consultation is currently open (see the following section "Next Steps" for further details and in “Useful links” for the link). The goal is to at least triple the EU's data centre capacity in the next five to seven years, prioritising highly sustainable data centres.

Increasing access to large and high-quality data

An important element of the Action Plan is the creation of Data Labs, bringing together and curating large, high-quality data volumes from different sources in AI Factories. A comprehensive Data Union Strategy will be launched in 2025 to create a true internal market for data that can scale up AI solutions.

Developing algorithms and fostering AI adoption in strategic EU sectors

Despite growing interest in AI, only about 13.5% of European companies currently use AI technologies. To close this gap, the Commission will soon launch the Apply AI Strategy, which will promote its industrial use and full adoption in EU strategic public and private sectors.

Strengthening AI skills and talents

To meet rising demand for AI talent, the Commission will facilitate international recruitment of highly skilled AI experts and researchers through initiatives such as the Talent Pool, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Action ‘MSCA Choose Europe' and AI fellowships schemes offered by the upcoming AI Skills Academy. These actions will empower both young professionals and experienced workers to take part in Europe’s AI future while creating legal pathways for highly skilled migrants in this field.

Regulatory simplification

The Commission will also launch the AI Act Service Desk, to help businesses comply with the AI Act. It will serve as the central point of contact and hub for information and guidance on the AI Act.

NEXT STEPS

To further shape these initiatives, the Commission opened also two public consultations, running until 4 June 2025:

A public consultation where anyone interested can share their views on the Cloud and AI Development Act. The Commission would like to gather different stakeholder views on the EU’s capacity in cloud and edge computing infrastructure, especially in light of increasing data volumes and demand for computing resources. A public consultation on Apply AI to identify stakeholder priorities, challenges to the uptake of AI, and the relevance of proposed solutions and policy approaches, including additional measures to ensure an easier application of the AI Act.

A third public consultation on Data Union Strategy will be launched in May.

In parallel, the Commission will organise dialogues with industry representatives and the public sector to help shape the Apply AI Strategy.

Commission tech chief Henna Virkkunen said the EU is “committed” to the act’s main goals but said the Commission is looking into the “administrative burden” and considering “some reporting obligations we could cut.”

BACKGROUND

The AI Continent Action Plan builds on a series of recent policy milestones, including the enforcement of the AI Act and the launch of InvestAI. These initiatives are aimed at making the EU digitally competitive in a short time, as it needs to catch up compared to its competitors.

The EU AI Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, aims to establish a legal framework for artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU and is the first regulation in the world to address AI in this comprehensive manner. It seeks to ensure that AI is used safely, ethically, and transparently while fostering innovation. The Act categorizes AI systems into four risk levels, imposing stricter requirements for higher-risk systems. These include data quality, transparency, accountability, and human oversight. At the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris (Feb 11, 2025), Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has launched InvestAI, an initiative to mobilise €200 billion for investment in AI, including a new European fund of €20 billion for AI gigafactories. This large AI infrastructure is needed to allow open, collaborative development of the most complex AI models and to make Europe an AI continent.